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tions spring to mind. To find individuals who embody the strong
notion of national sovereignty one looks to anti-heroes: perhaps
J.R. Ewing.
Professor Feinberg is well aware of these arguments against his
position. He uses similar arguments to cast doubt upon Kant's account of personal autonomy, which relies heavily on religious and
military metaphors. The difficulty is to construct a strong virtue of
personal independence that yields no hostages to those who would
march down the slippery slope of paternalism. An account which
treasures not pure individual choice, but some abstract virtue such
as the rationality within the individual choice, leaves room for state
intervention. If we value Kant's strong notion of rationality, we
may interfere with the individual's choice if it fails to select the
most rational alternative. National sovereignty values individual
choice in its full arbitrariness, and so fits coherently with a rejection
of paternalism, but I suspect that the analogy of national sovereignty, far from lending strength to the liberal case against paternalism, borrows credibility from the rejection of paternalism that it
will never be able to repay.

NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION. By Forrest McDonald.t Lawrence, Kan.: Kansas University Press. 1985. Pp.
xiii, 293. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $9.95.
Norman L. Rosenberg 2
"When reflecting upon government," muses Professor Forrest
McDonald, Americans have typically followed "the almost mystical
habit of thinking of threes." Related to classical political theory
and traditional social thought, this "habit may [also] have stemmed
from the concept of the Holy Trinity . . . ." Is it something more
than a historiographical fact, then, that Novus Ordo Sec/orum is
Professor McDonald's third book about the Constitution, our most
sacred political document?
In line with the bicentennial spirit, McDonald waxes more reverential than in his earlier volumes. Both We The People (1958),
I.

2.

Professor of History, University of Alabama.
Professor of History, Macalester College.
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which relentlessly trashed Charles Beard's classic Economic Interpretation, and E Pluribus Unum (1965), which advanced an alternative economic interpretation, highlighted the interplay between
hard-nosed politics and economics. Displaying the highly individual, sometimes quirky style that defines his scholarly persona, McDonald's second volume seemed out-of-place among the refined
intellectual histories, especially that of Gordon Wood, which lovingly cultivated the ideological groves of late eighteenth-century
America.3 Invoking, once again, the metaphor of threes, McDonald now concedes that his second book rated "two cheers but not
three" because it failed to confront ideological issues, especially
those related to "republican" thought. Subtitling this volume The
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, McDonald pursues that
third, and presumably final, cheer.
Novus Ordo Seclorum curiously recalls McDonald's first book:
while We the People challenged as too simplistic Beard's thesis that
two rival economic coalitions battled over the Constitution of 1787,
this book implicitly criticizes the view that two well-defined ideological structures, "republican" and "liberal," struggled to dominate the "intellectual origins" of constitution making. Drawing
upon the vast post-1965 secondary literature and his own reading of
diverse primary sources, McDonald emphasizes the many different,
often confused, sometimes conflicting, strands in late eighteenthcentury political discourse.
Much as he had done with economic structures two decades
earlier, McDonald now gives readers a dazzling tour of various
"systems of political theory." In addition to "republicanism"something to which many people came "late and willy nilly, with
neither a historical or philosophical understanding of what they
were embracing"-he explores subtle variations on natural rights
theory, the "country-oppositional ideology," and English commonlaw thought. Perhaps more important, he offers a highly original
survey of "political economy," a mode of analysis that first emerged
only in the late eighteenth century. Here, he shows special fondness
for Alexander Hamilton's formulations and disdain for most of
James Madison's ideas.4
3. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). For
recent commentaries which acknowledge Wood's book as the dominant force in the field, see
Forum: The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A. Symposium of Views andReviews, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1987). Meanwhile, though, the creation of different economic interpretations remains a thriving business. See. e.g., The Constitution as an Economic
Document: A. Symposium Commemorating the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. I (1987).
4. McDonald also debunks the conventional wisdom that Madison was "the father of
the Constitution." F. McDoNALD, NOVUS 0ROO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 0RI-
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McDonald still invokes his earlier work by linking the political
principles of the framers to various political, economic, and regional
interests. For example, a "puritanical republicanism," which revolved around an almost "totalitarian" preoccupation with monitoring the "virtue" of individual citizens-i.e., their willingness to
subordinate individual interests to the general public good-pervaded New England, while an "agrarian species of republicanism,"
which advocated a more limited view of government and the socially-created virtue of individual property holders, held sway in
other parts, especially in tobacco-planting areas.
Given the complex tangle of "principles and interests" that
criss-crossed both the new nation and the Philadelphia Convention,
McDonald dismisses reductionist notions about original intent. "It
should be obvious," he argues, "that it is meaningless to say that the
Framers intended this or that the Framers intended that: their positions were diverse and, in many particulars, incompatible. "s At
times even they themselves might have wondered exactly what they
intended. When discussing the commerce clause, "whose history is
shrouded in mystery," for instance, McDonald notes that today's
intention-seekers enjoy information, courtesy of modem scholarship, about the workings of the Convention's committee of style,
which the delegates themselves probably did not possess. 6
More important for serious students of the second United
States Constitution, McDonald sees the "republicanism" versus
"liberalism" debate, so prominent in recent historical and constitutional law scholarship, 1 as fatally simplistic. McDonald's multilayered arguments on this point defy easy summary. For example,
Gordon Wood's now familiar thesis-that the fight over the Constitution of 1787 demarcated the end of classical-republican and the
beginnings of modem, interest-group constitutionalism-draws
some of McDonald's ire. For McDonald, this A-gives-way-to-B
formulation, however elegantly elaborated, forgets that sophistiGINS OF THE CoNSTITUTION 205-09 ( 1985). See also Banning, The Practicable Sphere of a
Republic: James Madison, the Constitutional ConW!ntion, and the Emergence of Revolutionary Federalism, in BEYOND CoNFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CoNSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 162 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds. 1987) [hereinafter
BEYOND CoNFEDERATION] (emphasizing Madison's changing, but still central role); Hutson,

Riddles of the Federal Constitutional ConW!ntion, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 411 (1987) (questioning Madison's influence and also the authenticity of his much-cited documentary record).
5. F. McDoNALD, supra note 4, at 224.
6. /d. at 271.
7. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces of SelfGoW!rnment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986). See also Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New
Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1986); Banning, Jeffersonion Ideology Revisited: Liberal
and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986); Herzog,
Some Questions for Republicans, 14 PoL. THEORY 473 (1986).
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cated political leaders, especially George Washington, believed that
the search for "fame" and the desire for a good reputation could
preserve the old republican ideal of disinterested public service and
perhaps even prevent the "baser passions of most men" from corrupting politicallife.s
A Federalist partisan himself, McDonald applauds the kind of
political leader, epitomized by Washington and Hamilton, who triumphed at Philadelphia. Standing, in effect, amongst conflicting intellectual traditions and fierce political passions, this extraordinary
group of hardheaded reformers "devised a new order out of materials prescribed by the ages" and wisely drew "their Constitution
loosely enough so that it might live and breath and change with
time."
How, then, should scholars evaluate the ideas behind and
within the Constitution of 1787? Finding political-constitutional
discourse itself undergoing rapid change, especially during the late
1780s, McDonald charts the quick-moving twists and turns, especially over the term "republican," occurring in public debates.
When opponents of the Constitution attacked it as anti-republican,
for instance, the Hamiltons and Madisons deftly countered by redefining "republicanism" in novel but convincing ways. Even though
McDonald wants to underscore the ways in which the Constitution
of 1787 retained traditional ideals, the people at Philadelphia, and
those defending their efforts during the ratification struggles, ultimately "devised a novus ordo seclorum" and "rendered all previous
vocabulary obsolete as it pertained to the government of the United
States."
Too much constitutional scholarship, McDonald suggests, fails
to appreciate the innovations of 1787. Montesquieuan ideals about
separation of powers, for example, gave way to a novel system of
checks and balances. In McDonald's view, the governmental
structure envisioned in the Constitution contemplated a complex
arrangement of governmental power, not simply between the central and state levels but among local juries and militia groups. In
this sense, moreover, the Philadelphia document did not really rest
upon liberal, individualist contract theory. "Rather, it was a compact among political societies; there was not a single republic, or
even thirteen, but a multitude of them." With adoption of this new
8.

For an interpretation that differs, in part, from McDonald's on this point, see G.
GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1984).
Gordon Wood, meanwhile, also now warns that the question of republicanism or liberalism is
"badly put" and "assumes a sharp dichotomy between two clearly identifiable traditions that
eighteenth-century reality will not support." Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal
America, 44 WM. & MAllY Q. 628, 634 (1987).
WILLS,
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constitutional structure, the United States became "a nation composed of several thousand insular communities, each of which exercised virtually absolute powers over its members through the
traditional institutions of the jury and the militia." Thus, the framers' Constitution "defied categorization by any existing nomenclature .... "
Likewise, McDonald's own book sometimes defies familiar historiographical pigeonholes. A self-styled conservative, unlikely to
attend a CLS summer camp, McDonald nonetheless relies upon
Morton Horwitz's view of how the common law was reshaped in
the service of capitalist interests.9 And though McDonald draws
upon the work of such celebrated intellectual historians as Gordon
Wood and J.G.A. Pocock, he dissents from their emphasis upon the
powerful grip of ideological paradigms. In contrast to Wood's view,
that there is "no behavior without ideology" and that "ideas give
meaning to our action," McDonald's approach to the relationship
between constitutional rhetoric and politics sometimes recalls the
legal realists of the 1930s. McDonald's framers are "politically
multilingual," able to speak in whatever set of ideological symbols
"seemed rhetorically appropriate to the particular argument at
hand."
McDonald ignores much of the recent scholarshipw linking
constitutionalism to "the new social history." He offers no discussion, for example, on the "gendered meanings" of republicanism or
the ways in which urban artisans tried to reshape the elitist republican heritage to their own historical experience. To McDonald,
backcountry areas were not, as some social historians have argued,
misgoverned; they were essentially ungovernable. And though he
has "read virtually every line of virtually every extant American
newspaper" and "a large body of personal correspondence," McDonald generally credits the perspectives of the Federalist elite, especially when dealing, much too briefly, with the ratification
debates. If Madison and Hamilton, for example, were trying to reconstruct the discourse between 1787 and 1789, what about all of
the opponents of the Constitution? Here too, McDonald tends to
reject (or ignore) some of the recent scholarship, especially that
which praises the Anti-Federalists ofthe late 1780s, the people who
9. See M. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv.
57 (1987).
10. See, e.g., T. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION (1986) (favorable view of
complaints of misgovernment by backcountry protestors); S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMoCRATIC 61-103 (1984) (sympathetic portrait of "artisan republicanism"); Bloch, The
Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37 (1987).
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(according to Gordon Wood) "really belonged to the future."ll
Yet McDonald is too good a historian not to acknowledge
what the nineteenth century had in store for the United States, especially when his own acute analysis of political economy suggests
some of the ways in which legal-constitutional discourse intersected
with the rise of a nationwide, capitalist economy. Indeed, McDonald approaches the end of this book on a note of almost regretful
nostalgia. The coming of "the Age of Liberalism, the Age of Capitalism and Democracy," a society of hyperindividualists, would
have "neither room for nor need of the kind of virtuous public servants who so abundantly graced the public councils during the
Founding Era." The "race of pygmies [who] came to infest the
public councils" of later eras might even have destroyed the constitutional temple itself.
According to McDonald, though, the day of the locust never
quite arrived, and he closes with appropriately fileopietistic, upbeat
crescendos. He finds comfort in the earthly pull of cultural gravity,
his firm conviction that a deeply-rooted "cultural conservatism" has
helped to preserve the essential logic of the Constitution.12 The
wise men of Philadelphia, along with those almost as learned "Optimates" who immediately followed them, framed and then protected
a constitutional order that became "firmly established and selfmaintaining .... " After 200 years, "constitutional government had
become part of the second nature of homo politicus Americanus."B
McDonald ends with the Bismarckian line about a "special Providence" taking care of fools, drunks, and the United States.
"Surely," he concludes, "the Founders believed the last of these."
People less committed to this triad-Hamiltonian Federalism,
cultural conservatism, and divine Providence-will likely look beyond this book's vistas in order to explain even the "intellectual
origins" of the Constitution.l4 But Forrest McDonald's well11. See, e.g., Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in
BEYOND CoNFEDERATION, supra note 4, at 109. And on the importance of the ratification
debates across a spectrum of views even wider than McDonald surveys, see Kramnick, The
"Great National Discussion·~· The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. &. MARY Q. 3 (1988).
12. According to McDonald, the "principle of cultural conservatism, which describes a
far greater stabilizing force than government is familiar to anthropologists; but historians
commonly overlook it, concentrating upon politics and government." F. McDoNALD, supra
note 4, at 161 n.34.
13. For an essay criticizing the view that the new constitution actually encouraged the
Optimates, men of unique talent and vision to enter and remain in public office, something
that was a clear goal of many Federalists of 1787, see Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the
Accession of George Washington, in BEYOND CoNFEDERATION, supra note 4, at 261. And for
continual laments that people of talent have too often been absent from our public life, seeN.
ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 71-129 (1986).
14. See, e.g., The Constitution and American Life: A Special Issue, 74 J. AM. HtST. 661
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crafted book both nicely completes a distinguished author's personal cycle and insightfully raises new questions for historical and
constitutional debates.

THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Archibald
Cox.t Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1987. Pp. 434. $19.95.
David P. Bryden 2

Professor Archibald Cox's latest book is a popular history of
constitutional law, from "Miracle at Philadelphia" to the Rehnquist
Court. Part One ("Building a Nation") includes chapters on "Judicial Supremacy," "Federal Power and Supremacy," "Opening a
National Market," and "One Nation Indivisib!e." Part Two
("From Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State") contains four chapters
that bring the reader from the Civil War to "The Warren Court,"
which is the title of the introductory chapter in the third and final
historical section of the book, covering "The Nonconformists" (religion), "National Security and the First Amendment," "Protection
for the Accused," "School Desegregation," "Affirmative Action,"
"Political Equality," "Invidious Distinctions and Fundamental
Rights," and "Abortion." In the last chapter, Professor Cox muses
about "The Future of Judicial Review."
Although it does not purport to be very original, The Court
and the Constitution is a useful addition to the overcrowded shelves
of constitutional literature. It's much better written than most history books and would make excellent supplemental reading for law
students, not only to supply historical perspective but also to provide a coherent point of view about the great cases and problems, an
antidote to the confusion of class discussions and a foil-if that's
not too condescending a word-for any contrasting ideas the professor has to offer.
As history, Cox's work can best be judged by historians. Of
course, it isn't just history. Cox brings to his task a law professor's
characteristic concerns, and the book is a series of didactic essays
(1987); see esp. Appleby, The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798 (1987), an essay
that essentially stands McDonald on his head. See alsc Nash, Alsc There at the Creation:
Going Beyond Gordon S. Wood, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 602 (1987).
I. Carl M. Loeb University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University; Visiting Professor of Law, Boston University.
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

